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Background: Impaired insight is a common feature in 
psychosis and an important predictor of variables such as 
functional outcome, prognosis, and treatment adherence. 
A  cognitive process that may underlie insight in psychosis 
is self-reflection, or the conscious evaluation of one’s traits 
and characteristics. The current study aims to investigate the 
neural correlates of self-reflective processing and its relation-
ship with insight in schizophrenia. Methods: Forty-seven 
schizophrenia patients and 21 healthy controls performed 
a self-reflection task in a functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) scanner. The tasks comprised a self-reflec-
tion, close other-reflection, and a semantic (baseline) con-
dition. Insight scores were obtained with the Schedule of 
Assessment of Insight Expanded. In addition, cognitive 
insight scores were obtained (Beck Cognitive Insight Scale 
[BCIS]). Results: Schizophrenia patients demonstrated 
less activation in the posterior cingulate cortex in the self- and 
other-reflection conditions and less activation in the precu-
neus in the other-reflection condition compared with healthy 
controls. Better insight was associated with greater response 
in the inferior frontal gyrus, anterior insula, and inferior pari-
etal lobule during self-reflection. In addition, better cognitive 
insight was associated with higher activation in ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex during self-reflection. Conclusion: In 
the current study, evidence for a relationship between self-
reflection and insight in patients with schizophrenia was found 
in brain areas related to self-reflection, self/other distinction 
and source attribution. The findings support the rationale for 
a treatment that is currently under evaluation, which attempts 
to increase insight by enhancing self-reflection.
Key words: self-reflection/schizophrenia/psychosis/ 
insight/ cognitive insight/fMRI
Introduction
A growing body of research has described impaired 
insight as an important feature of schizophrenia occur-
ring in 50%–80% of schizophrenia patients.1 Insight can 
be distinguished into clinical insight and cognitive insight.
Clinical insight is defined as a multidimensional 
construct2 encompassing three dimensions: (1) awareness 
of illness, (2) relabeling symptoms, and (3) recognizing 
need for treatment. Impaired insight has been linked to 
poor treatment compliance, poorer treatment outcome, 
overall symptom severity, higher relapse, lower self-
esteem, and impaired psychosocial functioning (see ref.1  
for an overview). Insight can be studied as a set of 
descriptive beliefs regarding mental illness, the presence 
of symptoms or as a personal narrative.3 It is not merely 
the acceptance of a fact, patients create a narrative that 
contains a life story, which in varying degrees includes 
the mental illness and differs to the extent in which 
it is coherent and adaptive.4 Earlier findings reported 
insight being one of the best discriminators among 
psychotic disorders.5 Insight thus is an important 
factor for a good prognosis, indicating that increasing 
awareness is of potential clinical relevance. Despite the 
efforts to understand the underlying mechanisms, the 
determinants of poor insight remain unclear. Previous 
research demonstrated a relationship between insight and 
symptomatology6; however, insight change is not simply 
a consequence of changes in psychopathology.7 This 
indicates that other factors must play a role in the etiology 
of impaired insight. Some evidence is found for both 
the psychological defense model and the neurocognitive 
model as an explanation for poor insight.8 In the 
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as a form of denial in order to cope with the diagnosis.8 
In the neurocognitive model, impaired insight is seen as 
the result of neurocognitive deficit—either general or 
specific.8 Several studies show a relationship between a 
variety of cognitive functions and impaired insight, such 
as intelligence, memory and executive functioning; more 
specifically, mental flexibility and error monitoring are 
repeatedly associated with lack of insight (see ref.9 for a 
meta-analysis).
Cognitive insight is a construct referring to the ability 
to evaluate abnormal experiences and recognize incorrect 
interpretations.10 Patients with impaired cognitive insight 
may not distance themselves from abnormal experi-
ences and use feedback to correct their conclusions. Two 
dimensions of cognitive insight can be distinguished: (1) 
self-reflectiveness: “the patients’ capacity and willing-
ness to observe their mental productions and to consider 
alternative explanations,” and (2) self-certainty: “over-
confidence in the validity of their beliefs.”10 Although 
self-certainty seems to be state independent, self-reflec-
tiveness improves when psychotic symptoms diminish.11 
Interestingly, although insight as defined by David2 and 
cognitive insight showed a significant relationship in the 
initial validation,10 recent results are mixed suggesting 
that they may measure different constructs.12
Insight and Self-Reflection
It has been suggested that impaired insight may result 
from an inability to self-reflect.13–15 Self-reflection is 
defined as the process by which a person decides whether 
or not a certain attribution or environmental cue is appli-
cable to the self, eventually resulting in a representation 
of one’s traits, abilities, and attitudes.14 Discriminating 
between self and others, emotional awareness and a sense 
of control over one’s thoughts and actions form the basis 
of self-reflection.16 Impaired self-reflection demonstrates 
the difficulties in generating personal narratives that link 
the present and past, resulting in an inadequate self-image 
not incorporating a psychiatric disorder or psychiatric 
symptoms.13,14 Recent meta-analyses investigating the 
neural correlates of self-reflection revealed a network of 
brain regions associated with self-reflective processing.14,17 
Most importantly, this network encompasses the dorso-
medial and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC and 
vMPFC), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), poste-
rior cingulate cortex (PCC) (together termed the cortical 
midline structures [CMS]), anterior insula, inferior fron-
tal gyrus (IFG), and temporo-parietal junction/angular 
gyrus/inferior parietal lobule (IPL). In a cognitive neu-
ropsychiatric model for self-reflection, we described two 
reflection routes: (1) other-reflective processing (ACC, 
PCC, insula/IFG and dMPFC) and (2) self-reflective 
processing involving the same structures, but with an 
additional role for the vMPFC in the emotional tagging 
of stimuli for self-relevance.14 Murray and colleagues17 
recently extended this model by demonstrating that close 
other-reflection activation closely resembled self-reflection 
activation in the vMPFC, whereas distant other-reflection 
activation was more dorsally located. Their results suggest 
that the closer the other the more ventral the MPFC acti-
vation. This cognitive neuropsychiatric model will serve 
as a theoretical framework for the current study. A body 
of research demonstrated a relationship between impaired 
insight and smaller brain volumes in lateral, medial and 
orbitofrontal cortex and temporal and parietal areas (see 
for a recent overview Gerretsen et  al.).18 Furthermore, 
white-matter abnormalities in fronto-temporal networks 
have been related to impaired insight.19 Despite these 
findings, there is a paucity of functional neuroimaging 
research looking into the relationship between brain func-
tioning and impaired insight in psychiatric patients. Only 
two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) stud-
ies assessed the relationship between social processes and 
insight in schizophrenia patients (unpublished data).12,20 
Lee and colleagues20 showed increased left vMPFC activa-
tion in patients in a remitted compared with an acute state 
while evaluating empathic and forgivability judgements. 
This increase of activation was related to improvement of 
insight and social functioning. Bedford and colleagues21 
showed that higher levels of insight were related to higher 
activation during self-reflection in inferior parietal, supe-
rior frontal, and superior temporal areas, whereas lower 
levels of insight were related to higher activation in the 
right middle frontal cortex and precuneus. However, this 
study included only 11 schizophrenia patients, which 
makes replication important. In patients with mild cogni-
tive impairment, a self-appraisal task induced less activa-
tion in the MPFC and PCC, which was related to impaired 
awareness of their loss of functioning.22
In the current study, we tested a self-reflection task in 
a large sample of schizophrenia patients. We used the 
cognitive neuropsychiatric model for self-reflection14 as a 
theoretical framework and hypothesized that abnormal 
self-reflective processing or diminished introspection is a 
core problem in impaired insight. We expected that this 
would be reflected in a relationship between impaired 
insight and abnormal activation in this self-reflection 
network. In addition, we explored the relationship 
between cognitive insight and self-reflection in the brain.
Methods
Participants
A total of 47 patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
participated in the study (35 male, 12 female). We aimed 
to include patients with varying degrees of good insight on 
the one hand and of poor insight on the other. Therefore 
42 patients, inpatients as well as outpatients, were recruited 
from several mental health institutions in the North of the 
Netherlands. We asked treating clinicians to screen their 
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multidimensional construct of insight2 to estimate insight 
level and to ensure that both patients with good and with 
poor insight would be selected. Five patients came to us 
through patient and family organizations or the website of 
our study. Apart from one patient, their psychopathology 
was stable and they were aware of the availability of treat-
ment facilities. Their demographic and clinical variables 
did not differ from the other patients. The diagnosis was 
confirmed with the Mini International Neuropsychiatric 
Interview-Plus 5.0.0 (MINI-Plus,23 which was also used 
to exclude psychiatric disorders in the controls). Current 
severity and frequency of symptoms was assessed by 
trained raters with the positive and negative syndrome 
scale (PANSS).24 Twenty-one healthy control subjects (12 
male, 9 female) were recruited by means of flyers and post-
ers and matched for age, gender, and education.
Patients had to be free from other psychiatric disorders 
and from somatic or neurological disorders that may influ-
ence the central nervous system. Patients had to be stable 
on current medication; medication changes the week 
prior to scanning was considered an exclusion criterion. 
Healthy controls had to be free from current and past 
psychiatric disorders. Other exclusion criteria were MRI-
contraindications such as metal implants, red ink tattoos, 
pregnancy, and claustrophobia. All participants gave 
written informed consent, and the study had full approval 
of the Medical Ethics Committee. Participants received a 
monetary compensation (45 euros) for their participation. 
See table 1 for clinical and demographical characteristics.
Tests and Measures
Insight (SAI-E). Insight was measured with the Schedule 
of Assessment of Insight-Expanded version (SAI-
E),25 a 12-item semistructured interview measuring 
insight along the three dimensions of David2: relabeling 
symptoms, awareness of illness, and need for treatment. 
For subscale, a separate score can be calculated. Because 
not all participants were in treatment or gave permission 
to contact the treating clinician, the last three questions 
directed at the treating clinician could not be completed for 
all participants. To avoid exclusion of this patient group, 
we chose to use the subtotal score (items 1–9) of the SAI-E 
for all analyses. SAI-E subtotal scores and PANSS-G12 (a 
single PANSS item measuring insight) scores correlated 
significantly, indicating that both instruments measured 
the same construct (r = −0.67; P < 0.0001). Because the 
SAI-E has a more detailed distribution, these scores were 
used for further analyses with self-reflection results.
Cognitive Insight (BCIS). The Beck Cognitive Insight 
Scale (BCIS)10 is a self-report questionnaire containing 
two subcomponents: self-reflectiveness (eg, “Some of my 
experiences that have seemed very real may have been due 
to my imagination.”) and self-certainty (eg, “When people 
disagree with me, they are generally wrong.”). A separate 
self-certainty and self-reflectiveness score is obtained and 
a composite score is computed by subtracting the self-
certainty score from the self-reflectiveness score.
Insight and Cognitive Insight. Pearson correlations 
revealed a significant relationship between SAI-E subto-
tal and BCIS-self  certainty only (r = −0.334; P = 0.024). 
No relationship was found for SAI-E subtotal (P > 0.05) 
or the PANSS item G12 (P > 0.05) with either BCIS-self  
reflectiveness or BCIS composite. This suggests that the 
BCIS measures a somewhat different construct than the 
SAI-E and the PANSS G12.
Self-Reflection. Prior to the experiment, subjects re ceived 
task instructions and explanation of the experimental 
procedure. Participants had the opportunity to ask 
Table 1. Demographic and Clinical Characteristics for the Patient 








Age (years)a 34.3 (10.7) 47 30.0 (11.0) 21
Level of educationb 5.3 (1.1) 47 5.8 (0.8) 21
Gender (percentage male)c 75% 47 57% 21
PANSS (score)d
 Total 58.0 (13.4) 46
 Positive 14.8 (4.9) 46
 Negative 13.7 (4.6) 46
 General psychopathology 29.6 (7.0) 46
Insight d
 SAI-E
  Total 13.0 (5.7) 46
  Awareness 8.2 (3.5) 46
  Relabeling 3.3 (2.0) 46
  Treatment 1.5 (1.5) 46
 BCIS
  Composite score 6.6 (5.0) 46
  Self-reflectiveness 17.4 (6.2) 46





 Quetiapine  7
 Risperidone  2
 Haloperidol  1
 Perfenazine  1
 Pemozide  1
 None  2
aBetween group differences in age were nonsignificant (F(1,66) =   
2.368; P = 0.127).
bEducation level according to Verhage (1964). Median did not 
differ between groups (P = 0.082).
cBetween group differences in gender distribution were 
nonsignificant (χ2 = 2 041; P = 0.153).
dFor one patient, neither insight nor PANSS scores were available. 
This subject was not included in the regression analysis.
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questions and provided a name of a person close to them 
to present in the other-condition. We chose a close-other, 
so the two conditions (self-other) would not differ too 
much in terms of amount of stored (and potentially acti-
vated) person-knowledge.
In the scanner, task instructions were once more pre-
sented on the screen.
The self-reflection task contained 180 sentences, subdi-
vided into three main conditions (self, other, and semantic) 
of 60 sentences each, presented in E-prime (Psychology 
Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). We employed a ver-
sion of the task that had previously been validated and 
used by Modinos and colleagues26 to investigate neural 
correlates of self-reflection. In the self-condition, sen-
tences referred to the participant, using pronouns as “I” 
or “me”; in the other-condition, sentences referred to a 
relative or close friend of the participant, who remained 
the same throughout the task. The subject to whom the 
sentence referred to (I/me/name close-other) was always 
presented on the screen. Subjects were asked to indicate 
to what extent the sentences were applicable to themselves 
or the other person. In the semantic baseline condition, 
containing sentences of general knowledge, participants 
were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with 
the statement. Stimuli in self- and other-conditions were 
balanced for valence (positive [eg “I am a good friend”] 
and negative [eg “I get mad easily”]) and quality (men-
tal properties [eg “I am honest”] and physical properties 
[eg “I smell bad”]). Sentences in the semantic condi-
tion contained an equal number of true (eg “dogs run 
faster than snails”) and false (eg “snow is black”) state-
ments. Responses were given on a four-button response 
box. Response options were displayed on the screen as 
a reminder, ranging from 1 (fully disagree) to 4 (fully 
agree). Stimulus presentation lasted 4000 ms followed by 
a 500 ms fixation cross. Total task duration was approxi-
mately 15 min. The three main conditions (self/other/
semantic) were organized in a block design, each block 
containing five trials; subconditions (valence/quality) 
were organized event related. To keep the task as simi-
lar as possible between subjects, presentation of the three 
main conditions was semirandomized so that no two 
blocks per condition would be presented consecutively. 
Subconditions were presented fully randomized.
Image Acquisition
Functional and anatomical images were acquired using a 
3.0 Tesla whole body scanner (Philips Intera, Best, NL). 
The head was kept in position by an elastic band and foam 
cushions on each side of the head. Stimuli were projected 
on a screen visible through a mirror attached to the sense 
8 head coil. Functional images were acquired by T2*-
weighted echo planar images sequences. Each functional 
image consisted of 37 interleaved axial slices of 3.5 mm thick 
(slice gap = 0 mm; TR = 2.00 s; TE = 30 ms; FOV = 224.0, 
129.5, 224.0 mm; 64 × 64 matrix of 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.5 voxels). 
To prevent artefacts due to nasal cavities, images were 
tilted approximately 10° to the AC–PC transverse plane. 
A T1-weighted 3D fast field echo (FFE) anatomical image 
was acquired parallel to the bicommissural plane, cover-
ing the whole brain (170 slices; TR = 9 ms; TE = 3.5 ms; 
FOV = 232, 170, 256; voxel size: (1 × 1 × 1 mm).
Statistical Analyses
Behavioral Analysis. PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS Inc., 
Chicago, IL) was used for analyzing behavioral data. 
Gender differences were assessed with chi-square tests. 
Self-reflection data (reaction times [RT]) were tested 
with a repeated measures ANOVA with “condition” 
(self, other, and semantic) as a within-subjects factor and 
“group” (healthy controls and schizophrenia patients) 
as a between-subjects factor. Significance levels for all 
behavioral analyses was P < .05 two-tailed.
fMRI Analysis. After converting from Philips PAR to 
Analyze in MRI-cro, fMRI data were preprocessed and 
analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM 
8) (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) run in Matlab7 (The MathWorks 
Inc., Natick, MA). Orientation of functional images was 
manually adjusted to the anatomical image for each par-
ticipant separately. Then, the functional images were slice-
time corrected, realigned, and coregistered. After manually 
checking the coregistrations, images were spatially normal-
ized on an MNI T1 template and smoothed using a 3D iso-
tropic 10 mm full-width/half-maximum Gaussian kernel. 
In first-level analysis, three regressors were modeled: self, 
other, and semantic. A high-pass filter of 1.1 times the lon-
gest period between two subsequent trials of the same con-
dition was calculated to remove systematic low-frequency 
noise. For each subject, two contrasts were defined: (1) self  
> semantic and (2) other > semantic.
For second-level analyses, contrast images were entered 
into a 2 × 2 full factorial model, with condition (self and 
other) and group (patients and healthy controls) as fac-
tors. To verify whether the task-elicited activation in self-
reflection areas, the overall task effect was examined by 
calculating the main effect for (self > semantic), (other > 
semantic), [(self > semantic) – (other > semantic)], and 
[(other > semantic) – (self > semantic)] for all subjects com-
bined. Results were corrected for multiple comparisons 
(few, P < 0.05), minimum cluster size was set to 10 voxels.
Subsequently, group differences were examined for the 
same contrasts in region of interest analyses limiting the 
area of interest to self-reflection regions. Regions of inter-
est (ROI) were drawn based upon a recent self-reflection 
meta-analysis.17 For each contrast, a separate ROI tem-
plate was made by drawing a sphere of 20 mm (radius) 
around the cluster center coordinates reported by Murray 
et al.17 A total of four ROI templates were made: (1) self  
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(4) other > self. For ROI templates 2, 3, and 4, we chose 
to use the meta-analytic results for close-other, because 
this is most similar to our task conditions. Threshold for 
group comparisons was set to P  <  0.001 (uncorrected) 
and a minimum clustersize of 10 voxels.
Finally, second-level multiple-regression analyses were 
conducted to assess the relationship between insight and 
self-reflection. The contrast images of the patient group (for 
one patient, no insight scores were available. Therefore, this 
subject was not included in the regression analysis) were 
entered in the model and scores on overall insight, relabel-
ing symptoms, awareness of illness, and need for treatment 
(SAI-E) were separately added as covariates. The analyses 
were restricted to the same ROIs as the group compari-
sons. Thresholds were set to P < 0.001 (uncorrected) and 
a minimum cluster size of 10 voxels. The same regression 
analyses were conducted for cognitive insight (composite 
scores, self-reflectiveness scores, and self-certainty scores 
[BCIS] were separately added as covariates).
Results
Self-Reflection: Behavioral Results
The repeated measures ANOVA for RT revealed a main 
effect for condition (F(2,63) = 5.36; P = 0.007) and group 
(F(1,64) = 9.35; P = 0.007). No significant group × con-
dition interaction was demonstrated (P > 0.05). Thus, 
patients as well as healthy controls responded faster in 
the self-condition compared with the other- and seman-
tic conditions, but patients responded slower overall than 
healthy controls (see table 2).
No significant differences were demonstrated when 
analyzing the valence of the participants’ attribution of 
positive and negative qualities to self  or to other (P > 
0.05).
Neuroimaging Results
Overall Task Effect. The activation elicited by the self  
> semantic contrast for all subjects revealed signifi-
cant activation in self-reflection areas: PCC, precuneus, 
vMPFC and dMPFC, superior temporal gyrus (STG), 
insula and IFG (figure 1A). The other > semantic con-
trast revealed activation patterns that were very similar 
to the self  > semantic contrast: PCC, precuneus, vMPFC 
and dMPFC, middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and STG 
(figure 1B). The contrast self  > other only revealed one 
cluster of activation including the supramarginal gyrus 
(SMG) and IPL (figure 1C). The inverse contrast other > 
self  showed significant clusters of activation in the PCC, 
middle temporal gyrus (MTG), and STG (figure 1D; see 
table 3 for all peak activations).
Group Differences. Healthy control subjects revealed 
increased activation in the PCC for the self  > seman-
tic contrast (figure  1E). The other > semantic contrast 
revealed increased activation for the healthy controls in 
the PCC and precuneus (figure 1F). No group differences 
were observed for the contrasts self  > other or other > 
self. Patients did not reveal increased activation com-
pared with the healthy controls in any of the contrasts 
(see table 3 for all peak activations).
Self-Reflection and Insight. For the contrast self  > 
semantic, a positive relationship was demonstrated for 
subtotal insight score in the left insula, left IFG, and left 
IPL/angular gyrus (figure 2A–C; table 3 for all peak acti-
vations). The subscales awareness of illness and relabeling 
of symptoms did not reveal any additional areas of activa-
tion; we did not find areas of activation related to need for 
treatment. No negative relationship with overall insight 
or any of the subscales was found. For the contrasts other 
> semantic, self  > other, and other > self, no relation-
ships with insight could be demonstrated.
Self-Reflection and Cognitive Insight. FMRI analyses 
revealed a relationship between BCIS self-reflectiveness 
and activation in the bilateral vMPFC for the contrast 
self  > semantic (see figure 2D–G; table 3 for all peak acti-
vations). No relationship was found in any of the other 
contrasts, for BCIS self-certainty, or the BCIS composite 
score related to activation in any of the contrasts.
Discussion
The current study aimed to investigate the relationship 
between the neural underpinnings of self-reflection 
and insight in a relatively large and heterogenuous 
sample of schizophrenia patients. Most importantly, 
we demonstrated that impaired insight is related to 
brain activation during self-reflection in the left insula, 
left IFG and left IPL/angular gyrus. Furthermore, we 
demonstrated a relationship between self-reflection 
activation and cognitive insight (BCIS) in the bilateral 

















Self — 2.38 (0.3) — 2.15 (0.4)
 Positive 59 2.31 (0.3) 81 2.08 (0.4)
 Negative 22 2.46 (0.4) 14 2.19 (0.3)
Other — 2.44 (0.4) — 2.25 (0.4)
 Positive 68 2.48 (0.4) 79 2.22 (0.4)
 Negative 16 2.41 (0.4) 17 2.32 (0.4)
Semantic 53 2.52 (0.3) 57 2.25 (0.4)
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vMPFC. Schizophrenia patients in general showed 
hypoactivation for self-reflection, as well as other-
reflection, in the PCC and precuneus compared with 
healthy control subjects. Task effects in the whole group 
analysis revealed activation that is consistent with the 
literature on self-reflection, which implies that our 
paradigm was valid.
Self-Reflection, Other-Reflection, and Schizophrenia
Both self- and other-reflection induced more brain 
activation in the PCC and precuneus in healthy 
controls compared with schizophrenia patients. PCC 
and precuneus have previously been related to self- and 
other-reflective processings,14,17 experiencing a sense of 
self,27 the evaluation of other people’s qualities,14,17 and 
the retrieval of autobiographical memories.28 Decreased 
anatomical and functional connectivity for schizophrenia 
patients in the PCC has been demonstrated, which 
points toward functional abnormalities in this region 
for this patient group.29 According to the cognitive 
neuropsychiatric self-reflection model, the PCC is 
involved in coupling past experiences to current self-
relevant stimuli and may be required for decision-making 
processing regarding the self, as well as a close other.14 
D’Argembeau and colleagues30 showed more activation 
Fig. 1. Brain activation self-reflection task. Main effects for (A) self  > semantic (B) other > semantic (C) self  > other (D) other > self. 
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in the PPC during reflection upon current self  compared 
with past self. Decreased functioning of the PCC may 
hamper this coupling of experiences, limiting the ability 
to compare current and past self-relevant information 
and subsequently the ability to update the self-image and 
the image of the close-other. We found larger between 
group activation in other-reflection vs self-reflection. 
Modinos and colleagues26 also found this in the PCC, 
suggesting that retrieving information about another 
and mentalizing about another takes more effort than 
about self.
Other studies investigating similar constructs in 
patients with schizophrenia reported varying results (see 
also David et  al.).12 Some studies demonstrated hypo-
activation for patients with schizophrenia in the self- 
reflection network. Bedford and colleagues21 showed 
decreased activation for schizophrenia patients in medial 
and lateral frontal areas for self- and other-reflection vs 
baseline. Murphy and colleagues31 found similar results as 
the current study: hypoactivation in patients with schizo-
phrenia for self  vs baseline in the precuneus and lingual 
gyrus and for other vs baseline in IPL and lingual gyrus. 
Fig. 2. Associations with insight and brain activation for self  > semantic. (A) Activation positively related to insight subtotal score. 
Correlation mean response of activation with subtotal score of insight in (B) insula/IFG (r = 0.53) and (C) IPL/angular gyrus (r = 0.54). 
Activation positively related to self-reflectiveness in (D) left vMPFC and (E) right vMPFC. Correlation mean response of activation with 
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Table 3. Peak Activations Self-Reflection Task
Region BA Clustersize (voxels) T-value
MNI Coordinates
x y z
Main task effect all subjects
 Self  > semantic PCC/precuneus 7/23/31 6578 16.10 −6 −52 34
9.09 0 −20 32
vMPFC/dMPFC 8/9/10/24/32 5135 13.8 −2 64 12
12.47 −4 54 6
9.55 −12 58 32
MTG 20/21/38 209 8 −46 −2 −30
SMG/STG 39/40 740 7.28 −48 −56 24
7.12 −52 −62 36
IPL/SMG 40/2/3 748 6.76 58 −26 50
6.01 62 −20 40
5.82 44 −32 42
MTG 21 35 5.72 50 8 −30
IFG/insula 47 70 5.61 −28 18 −14
STG 39 15 4.99 58 −60 26
 Other > semantic PCC/precuneus 7/23/31 6825 21.77 −6 −52 34
8.56 0 −22 30
vMPFC/dMPFC 8/9/10/24/32 5250 16.31 −2 64 14
12.41 −6 60 32
10.68 −8 50 44
STG/SMG 22/39/40 1368 10.6 −48 −58 24
10.33 −52 −64 34
STG/MTG/temporal 
pole
13/21/38 982 10.41 −50 0 −28
10.4 −42 10 −32
8.94 −56 −8 −16
STG/MTG/temporal 
pole
21/38 335 8.82 50 8 −30
8.03 60 −4 −20
4.98 36 16 −20
SMG/STG 39/40 778 8.38 58 −62 26
7.96 50 −60 30
 Self  > other SMG/IPL 2 105 5.2 58 −28 50
4.82 60 −26 40
 Other > self PCC/Precuneus 7/23/31 1460 7.14 −2 −52 30
MTG 21 92 5.61 −54 −4 −18
5.4 −60 −10 −12
STG 38 25 5.2 −40 12 −30
STG 15 4.87 46 −58 28
Group differences healthy controls > schizophrenia patients
 self  > semantic PCC 23 21 3.42 −6 −38 28
 other > semantic PCC/precuneus 31 585 4.46 −8 −46 18
3.94 −6 −38 24
3.76 4 −68 16
Associations with insight for schizophrenia patients only
 Self  > semantic
  SAI-E subtotal Insula/IFG 48 47 4.57 −38 18 12
IPL/angular gyrus 39 110 4.40 −36 −64 42
  SAI−E awareness of illness Insula/IFG 48 20 3.94 −38 18 12
IPL/angular gyrus 39/40 126 4.58 −36 −66 44
3.96 −32 −36 34
  SAI-E relabeling symptoms Insula/IFG 48 66 4.18 −38 16 12
IPL/angular gyrus 39/40 45 3.47 −38 −62 42
18 3.21 −44 −50 30
Associations with cognitive insight for schizophrenia patients only
 Self  > semantic
  Self-reflectiveness Left vMPFC 32 71 4.06 −14 44 10
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They concluded that schizophrenia patients in general 
have an impaired awareness of  self  and others. Other 
studies showed hyperactivation in the PCC in schizo-
phrenia patients for self  vs baseline32 and self  vs other33 
contrasts. Such differences may be caused by slightly 
differing experimental paradigms and baseline control 
conditions. Holt and colleagues32 used positive vs nega-
tive valence evaluation and Shad and colleagues33 did not 
use a baseline condition. In our study, we used nonva-
lenced statements of  general knowledge. This dimishes 
chances of  associations with either self  or other making 
it more reliable as a baseline condition. Moreover, for all 
four studies sample sizes were below 20 per group, so the 
results may not be robust.
Self-Reflection and Insight
Most importantly, we demonstrated a relationship 
between level of insight and brain activation in the 
left IFG, anterior insula, and left IPL/angular gyrus 
activation; better insight was related to higher activation 
in these areas. The region of activation in the left IFG and 
left anterior insula, also together termed ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (vLPFC), has been related to many 
cognitive processes, including the cognitive control of 
affective and nonaffective stimuli,34 theory of mind 
processing,35 and the integration of bodily and cognitive 
information.36 Direct relationships between subjective 
bodily and emotional feelings have been associated with 
activation in the anterior insular cortex.37 Modinos et al.38 
demonstrated higher insula activation in subjects prone 
to psychosis during self-reflection, which was interpreted 
as a stronger emotional and interoceptive responses. The 
insula may be activated as an emotional response evoked 
by self-reflection.39 As such activation in the anterior 
insula may reflect an emotional reaction to self-reflection, 
rather than self-reflection itself. In patients with impaired 
insight, such an emotional response may fail to occur 
because the self-reflective process is hampered to begin 
with. Decreased activation in the vLPFC in patients 
with schizophrenia has been related to misattributions 
of self-generated speech and40 misattributions of mental 
states.41 Habel and colleagues42 showed that activation 
in the vLPFC in schizophrenia patients increased after 
following a training program for the improvement of 
affect recognition. Thus, the vLPFC seems important 
in the cognitive control of emotional and self-related 
processes. Reduced insight may result from an impairment 
in the integration of information coming from the 
outside world and internal information (eg beliefs about 
the self  from autobiographical memory), resulting in a 
personal narrative that lacks complexity and does not 
include being ill or in need of treatment. It is not the mere 
acceptance of a fact, but the construction of a sufficiently 
rich narrative by integrating information into a coherent 
and adaptive account. A lack of such integration may be 
caused by malfunctioning of the vLPFC.
Besides the vLPFC, we found a relationship between 
insight and the IPL/angular gyrus. Literature suggests 
that the IPL plays an important role in movement evalua-
tion and the inhibition of automatic actions43 and distin-
guishing the attribution of an action between the self  and 
the another person.44 Ruby and Decety45 demonstrated 
that specifically the left IPL is involved in first-person per-
spective taking, whereas the right IPL is important in tak-
ing the perspective of others. Together, this suggests that 
this process of agency and distinguising between self and 
other may be hampered in patients with impaired insight.
Mapping these results on the cognitive neuropsychiat-
ric model of self-reflection suggests that at least one node 
within the self-reflection network seems to be of impor-
tance in explaining impaired insight in schizophrenia: 
the IFG/insula or vLPFC, important in the integration 
of external and internal information. Furthermore, our 
results suggest that distinguishing between self  and other, 
mediated by the IPL, is an important additional process 
for gaining insight in schizophrenia.
Self-Reflection and Cognitive Insight
Results demonstrated that self-reflectiveness is related to 
activation in the bilateral vMPFC during self-reflection. 
Hence, it appears that in our sample BCIS self-reflective-
ness (SR) is, perhaps not surprisingly, much closer to the 
construct measured by our experimental self-reflective-
ness task than the broader concept of insight and has acti-
vated the expected neural substrate. This could be further 
explored in healthy subjects in whom self-reflectiveness 
may be treated as a cognitive style or trait with the pre-
diction that higher scores on the SR subscale would cor-
relate with greater activation of cortical midline systems.
Another way of looking at this pattern comes from our 
previous work suggesting that the vMPFC may be specifi-
cally related to emotionally tagging stimuli for self-rele-
vance.14 Murray and colleagues17 complemented our work 
and demonstrated that activation in the vMPFC is impli-
cated in close-other reflection, as well as self-reflection, 
suggesting that the area may be salience related. Our results 
thus suggest that the ability to observe one’s own mental 
production may depend upon the ability to emotionally 
tag stimuli and recognize that a stimulus refers to the self. 
If the patient does not recognize this, then observing one’s 
own thoughts and evaluating alternative explanations is 
problematic. Insight is likely a multifactorial construct. In 
addition to self-reflection processes, other factors such as 
coping mechanisms and attributional style may contribute 
to insight. Further research could look at the role of these 
mechanisms in relation to the present findings.
Limitations
Some limitations need to be addressed. Antipsychotic med-
ication may have influenced brain activation. However, in 
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insight, only patients were included. Because most patients 
did use some type of antipsychotics, possible medication 
effects will be averaged out. Possibly, the overall slower RTs 
in patients may have been caused by medication; however, 
this was not our main area of interest. Furthermore, for 
practical reasons, patients had to be stable on their current 
medication resulting in a patient sample with rather low lev-
els of psychopathology. However, patients did show a wide 
variability of insight. In fact, it may be even more interest-
ing to test the neural basis of insight in a stable group of 
patients. Although the relationship between symptomatol-
ogy and insight is small, minimizing the moderative effect 
of symptoms should increase our chances on finding other 
underlying mechanisms of poor insight. Finally, measur-
ing brain activation in the ventromedial prefrontal areas is 
prone to scanner artifacts. Although we tilted the scans 10 
degrees, this may not have been enough to prevent the arti-
fact. The study should be replicated with scanner param-
eters that limit chances on this artifact even more.
Conclusion
In sum, we propose that self-reflective processing is related 
to level of insight. More specifically, activation in areas 
important for the integrating internal and external stimuli 
(vLPFC) and distinguishing between self and other (IPL) 
show a positive relationship with level of insight. In addi-
tion, cognitive insight may be positively related to activa-
tion in the vMPFC. These results suggest that the process 
of self-reflection may contribute to gaining insight in 
one’s symptoms and one’s psychiatric condition. Further 
research should investigate whether teaching patients to 
closely evaluate their own personality, qualities, and char-
acteristics may help them achieve insight in their disorder. 
Pijnenborg and colleagues46 examine a new treatment that 
attempts to enhance insight based on a model where self-
reflection is increased. This is currently under evaluation.
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